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Abstract. This paper describes a game to be played among mechanism de-
signers which supports every equilibrium outcome function supportable in any
competing mechanism game. A characterization of the set of supportable out-
come functions is provided. This game can be used to model competition in
environments where it is diﬃcult to know exactly what the extensive form of
the competing mechanism game is, or in games, like common agency games
in which there are a large number of equilibria. The point of this approach
is to try to understand the implications of restrictions on players ability to
contract by imposing these restrictions on an environment where players are
otherwise unrestricted. This provides an alternative to the usual approach in
which contracting restrictions are implicitly bundled into a speciﬁc extensive
form game.
1. Introduction
In many interesting environments, competition between ﬁrms involves much
more than simple price competition. Sellers at eBay attract buyers by allowing
them to bid in auctions, or to purchase at a ﬁxed (buy it now) price, or to choose
between some combination of the two. Principals in a common agency vie for an
agents’ attention with non-linear pricing contracts, the beneﬁts of which depend
on what kinds of non-linearities exist in the contracts oﬀered by other principals.
Groups of bidders in procurement auctions collude in an eﬀort to compete both
with other bidders and with the auctioneer.
Competition among mechanism designers, apart from being ubiquitous in con-
tractual environments, suggests explanations for some of the more troubling as-
pects of mechanism design. For example, it seems reasonable to imagine that the
implausibe side payments used by Cremer and McLean (1988) to extract surplus in
auctions will be eliminated, or at least mitigated in the presence of competition.
1
The traditional approach to modelling competition is to choose from a small
number of very speciﬁc extensive form games. For example in the competing auc-
tion literature, ﬁrms simultaneously and publicly post reserve prices (Peters and
Severinov (1997), Virag (2010)) before buyer choose the auction where they bid.
In the common agency literature, many principals simultaneously oﬀer menus to a
single agent (Bernheim and Whinston (1986)).
In the equilibrium of the competing auction game, reserve prices are close to
sellers’ true costs provided there are enough buyers and sellers. The desired in-
terpretation is that equilibrium mechanisms don’t depend on traders’ beliefs when
there is enough competition. What is very unclear in this story is whether this kind
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of convergence result occurs because there is competition, or because the extensive
form associated with the competing auction game embeds implicit assumptions
about how players communicate and what contracts they can oﬀer. For exam-
ple, if players are allowed to be more creative when choosing their mechanisms,
then a host of new equilibrium outcomes emerges.
2 Yamashita (2010) explains why
multiple equilibria are inevitable when principals can communicate with agents
in unconstrained ways. In those happy situations in which the set of equilibrium
outcomes can be show to be small even when there is competition (for example,
Andrea Attar and Selanie (2011)), it is unclear whether results are robust to small
changes in the way that players communicate or to changes in the set of contracts
players are allowed to oﬀer.
There are also many problems that involve competing mechanisms, but which
don’t naturally ﬁt in the common agency or competing mechanism models. A
nice is example is collusion which involves a bargaining procedure among privately
informed players who presumably make commitments in an attempt to inﬂuence
group behavior. Since collusion is often illegal, it is pretty much impossible to
understand what the extensive form is that governs the collusive process.
The objective of this paper is to try to understand contractual restrictions the
’other way round’. Our objective is to provide an extensive form game that is free
of any implicit assumptions about players’ ability to communicate or to contract.
This game is called the reciprocal contracting game. Formally, the reciprocal con-
tracting game has the property that if an outcome function can be supported as an
equilibrium in some extensive form contracting game among players, then it can
also be supported as an equilibrium in the reciprocal contracting game. Of course,
we supply an explicit characterization of this set of outcome functions.
At ﬁrst glance, the reciprocal contracting game plays the same role for competing
mechanisms as direct mechanisms do in single mechanism designer environments.
However, the objectives are very diﬀerent. When we use a direct mechanisms we are
typically trying to ensure than we don’t accidentally impose restrictions on what
the mechanism designer can do. Thinking with direct mechanisms makes it clear
why forcing sellers to sell at a ﬁxed price is restrictive. In a competing mechanisms
environment, on the other hand, we typically know there are restrictions on players’
contracting ability. We want to know what happens when these restrictions fail,
either because the players ﬁnd ways around them, or because we misunderstood
the restrictions in the ﬁrst place.
Since the reciprocal contracting game is eﬀectively a proxy for all other compet-
ing mechanism games, we can impose broad restrictions on this game, then use its
simple structure to trace out the eﬀect these restrictions have on supportable out-
comes. This makes it possible to derive conclusions about contracting restrictions
that apply across essentially all possible extensive forms.
Our approach is to separate the contractual environment into two parts. The
ﬁrst is that part of the environment that is easy to identify and conceptualize. For
example, if a market is organized as a double auction, then utimately we are safe
in assuming that players will submit bits in that auction, and that those bids will
determine prices according to some enforceable rule. We model these observable
restrictions by assuming there is a default game players play.
2In common agency, there is a continuum of equilibrium outcomes when principals oﬀer menus
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The second part of the environment is the part that we cannot readily identify.
For example, we may suspect that players are colluding in this double auction. If
they are, they are presumably bargaining with each other over commitments. We
don’t know how they do this, nor do we know what kinds of commitments are
enforceable.
Alternatively, in a competing auction environment, it may be readily apparent
that sellers are running auctions. It may be less clear whether they are communi-
cating with agents (or with each other) in other ways.
The rest of the paper describes a model of this unobservable part. This model,
together with the default game itself make up the reciprocal contracting game.
The point of the reciprocal contracting game is not to provide a realistic descrip-
tion of competing mechanisms, but to provide an environment in which players are
able to support anything that can be attained as a collusive outcome. Most of the
paper is devoted to making it formally clear what this means, and to showing that
the reciprocal contracting game actually works.
The reciprocal contracting game can then be used in one of two diﬀerent ways.
Since it can be used to mimic the equilibrium outcomes of any contracting game,
it can be used to test the robustness of standard mechanisms to collusion. This
simply paralells the idea in Laﬀont and Martimort (1997). The default game in
this approach is a simple direct mechanism designed by some grand mechanism
designer. The unobserved part is the process that players use to collude against
this mechanism.
Laﬀont and Martimort (1997) assume that the agents have access to some dis-
interested coordinator who will propose a collusive mechanism which will be im-
plemented if agents unanimously agree to accept it. The approach here simply
considers all the outcome functions that can be supported by some kind of decen-
tralized collusive process. Interestingly, we show that the set of collusive outcomes
that can be supported by decentralized contracting is strictly larger than the set
considered by Laﬀont and Martimort (1997). There are two reasons for the dif-
ference. First, contracting games can be designed that allow players to commit to
punishments when some player refuses to cooperate, while Laﬀont and Martimort
(1997) assume that players simply play the default mechanism absent unanimous
agreement. Second, our method picks up continuation equilibrium in the contract-
ing game which might be bad for both the grand mechanism designer and the
colluding agents, while Laﬀont and Martimort (1997) assume that the coordinator
can assure that agents play the equilibrium which maximizes their ex ante payoﬀ.
As a second approach, the reciprocal contracting game is simple enough that it
is possible to use it analyze the impact of contractual restrictions. Again, using the
analogy with the collusion proofness problem, a change in the default game (anal-
ogous to a change in the grand mechanism in Laﬀont and Martimort (1997)) will
change the set of outcome function supportable as equilibrium during the contract-
ing process. The characterization inqualities described below can then be used to
analyze the impact of these changes. Alternatively, it is straightforward to derive
the additional constraints on supportable allocations that arise when some players
in the game have no commitment ability at all. In the extreme case in which no
players can commit, for example, the set of supportable outcomes in the reciprocal
contracting ame reduces to the set of communication equilibria (Forges (1986)).4 MICHAEL PETERS
Lack of commitmement ability is a natural way to approach the Cremer Maclean
’problem’. Our approach shows that competition by itself is not enough to elim-
inate Cremer-Maclean like equilibrium outcomes in which one side of a trading
market gets all the surplus by using complex side payments. If players have enough
commitment power and enough ability to communicate, they can circumvent com-
petitive pressures. However, when players aren’t able to commit, they must play
the double auction (say) non-cooperatively. If they do, the default game will pro-
vide an outside option that limits the ability fo the remaining players to extract
surplus.
The reciprocal contracting game is also rich enough to provide a framework
within which more complex restrictions can be analyzed. For example, as in Laﬀont
and Martimort (1997), it might seem reasonable to assume that collusive agreements
are possible, but that punishments cannot be enforced when agreement breaks
down. In the recirpocal contracting game this restriction is captured by imposing a
straightforward restriction on the set of feasible contracts. Celik and Peters (2011a)
have shown that the set of collusive outcomes supportable as perfect Bayesian
equilibrium can be strictly enlarged by considering agreements in which some types
are expected not to participate on the equilibrium path. Celik and Peters (2011b)
use the recirpocal contracting approach to try to characterize supportable collusive
outcomes for this case.
The point of this paper is not to address any of these issues directly, but to try
to show why the reciprocal contracting game can be used to represent competing
mechanism games more generally. For the rest of the paper we focus mostly on
the methodology here. We begin by discussing an example that illustrates the
approach. We then provide the main theorems in the paper before we return to
discuss the relationship with other papers in the literature.
2. Example
Since modeling collusion is one problem for which the approach is likely to be
useful, we consider a simple example in which buyers and sellers bid in a double
auction. At this point we are simply interested in whether sellers can use reciprocal
contracts to enforce what, for them, is a collusive outcome.
In this story, there are two sellers and two buyers (i.e. four players in all). Each
seller has a single unit of output to which he or she assigns a value of 0. Each buyer
has a private valuation, either vl or vh ranked in the obvious way with 0 < vl < vh.
Payoﬀs to the seller are equal to the money he receives while payoﬀs to each buyer
are equal to their private valuation when they succeed in trading, less the money
they pay. We assume that valuations are correlated. To make life simple suppose
that both valuations are the same with probability q > 1
2 and that they are equally
likely to (both be) vh or vl in that case.
In the double auction that guides the interaction between them, players submit
bids. The two available goods are awarded to the two highest bidders at a price
equal to the third highest bid with the proviso that if there are more than two
highest bidders, then the good is awarded to buyers whenever possible and randomly
otherwise. For the purposes of illustration, focus on pure strategy equilibrium.
There is a continuum of (ex post eﬃcient) Bayesian equilibrium outcomes for this
game in which all bidders bid q ∈ (0,vl) independent of type. The best that sellers
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value buyers earn vh − q and low valuation buyers earn vl − q. In all of these
equilibrium outcomes trade occurs for sure.
There may also be ineﬃcient asymmetric equilibria in which the trading price is
above vl with positive probability.3 In these equilibria, one seller bids some price
ph that lies strictly between vl and vh, while the other bids vl. Buyers bid ph when
their value is high and vl otherwise. The seller who submits the high bid sells only
if both buyers have high values. So his expected revenue is q
p
h
2 . He can ensure
trade at a price vl by cutting his bid to vl, so a necessary condition for this to be
supported in equilibrium is that q
p
h
2 ≥ vl. If this inequality is strict, the seller who
submits the high bid does better than he does in the eﬃcient equilibrium. From
the inequality it is apparent that an ineﬃcient outcome like this can make some
seller better oﬀ only if vh is at least 2
q times as large as vl.
We are interested in whether there is some kind of collusive outcome in which
sellers can squeeze out more surplus than they do in these Bayesian equilibrium out-
comes of the double auction. What makes this a conceptually challenging problem
is the fact that it is hard to know how sellers would negotiate such an agreement
and how they would enforce it.
Whatever this collusive mechanism is, it must ultimately be ineﬃcient. It will
have to resemble the ineﬃcient collusive equilibrium in the sense that one of the
sellers withdraws his output in order to drive up price. Whatever agreement the
sellers reach will ultimately determine a trading price in the auction for the three
diﬀerent informational outcomes - both high value, both low value, diﬀerent values.
The argument we are trying to make is that in order to understand what sellers
could do, we don’t need to model the collusion directly. Instead, the best they can
do can be understood by maximizing payoﬀ subject to a set of inequalities.
To illustrate, suppose the players come to some sort of agreement that results
in three prices are phh, pll and phl that prevail when both buyers have high values,
both buyers have low values, or buyers have diﬀerent values. The sellers have to
ﬁnd a way to share the trading responsibility and to make the trading outcomes
incentive compatible. Such a scheme would have to be incentive compatible and
have the property that all the players would want to participate. It is reasonably
straightforward in this simple environment to ﬁnd the scheme that maximizes the
expected proﬁt of the sellers.
In order for the high value buyer to be willing to accept the lottery between
prices phh and phl, he should prefer that lottery to what he could get by pretending
to be a low value buyer. This give the completely standard incentive condition
q (vh − phh) + (1 − q)(vh − phl) ≥




He trades for sure if his value is high at a price that might depend on the value of
the other buyer. Since one of the sellers submits a high bid, he will fail to trade if
he pretends to be low value and the other buyer has a high value. If the other other
buyer’s value is low, he will have the same chance to trade as the other buyer - 1
2.




(vl − pll) ≥ q (vl − phl) + (1 − q)(vl − phh).











Figure 2.1. The Solution
As for participation, the worst that can happen is the traders who do participate
manage to drive prices down (if the non-participant is a seller) or up (if a buyer) so
that the non-participating trader can’t earn any surplus by bidding alone. For the
moment, just assume that this is what will happen to a non-participant. Then the
individual rationality constraint simply requires all participants earn non-negative
surplus.














It is relatively easy to ﬁgure out what the sellers’ best ex ante surplus is subject to
these incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints.
To begin, observe that the low value bidder only trades at price pll. So he won’t
be willing to participate if pll > vl. It is then immediate that pll = vl at the solution
to this problem. Then most of the solution can be gleaned from the following Figure
2.1:
The steeper of the two curves in ﬁgure describes the set of (phh,phl) pairs that
make the high type buyer indiﬀerent between revealing his type and pretending to
be a low value buyer. This presumes that the price when both buyers claim to have
low values is vl. The high value buyer pays prices phh and phl when he trades. So
if these are too high, he will be better oﬀ pretending to be low value and getting
nothing. The set of price pairs that are incentive compatible for the high value
buyer are those below the curve for this reason.
The ﬂatter of the two curves4 represents the set of price pairs that make the low
value buyer indiﬀerent between revealing his type truthfully and pretending to be
high value. Reversing the reasoning above, if the prices (phh,phl) are too low, the
low value buyer will want to pretend to have a high value so he can buy at these
low prices. As a result, the prices that are incentive compatible for the low value
buyer are those above this curve. The set of prices that are incentive compatible
for both are those in the shaded area,
4The curves have diﬀerent slopes because the low and high value buyer have diﬀerent beliefs
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The sellers’ iso-proﬁt function has the same slope as the steeper of the two curves,
as is readily seen by comparing (2.1) and (2.3) above. As a result, any pair of prices
on the upper right edge of the shaded triangle constitute a solution to the problem
deﬁned above.
This diagram has been drawn with a q high enough that some ineﬃcient equi-
libria exist in the double auction. To see where they are, travel out along the
horizontal ray through vl until you cross into the shaded region. The pairs that
lie in the shaded region on this horizontal ray to the left of vh are the prices that
can be supported as ineﬃcient equilibria in the double auction without any kind
of contracting. The reason for pointing them out is that they lie well below the
upper edge of the triangle where sellers ex ante proﬁts are maximized. As we are
going to argue that all the point along the upper edge of the shaded triangle can
be supported as equilibria, this illustrates that collusive equilibrium with recip-
rocal contracting allows sellers to do much better than they do in any Bayesian
equilibrium of the double auction by itself.
Many of these outcomes along the upper edge of the shaded triangle look quite
odd. For example, at the top left of the shaded triangle is an outcome in which
the price is very high when the buyers have diﬀerent values, but falls to zero when
both buyers have high values. In the main body of the paper, we will show how all
of these outcomes can be supported as perfect Bayesian equilibrium in a reciprocal
contracting game. To illustrate the logic, we focus on a much more prosaic outcome
in which the trading price is p∗ > vh when both buyers have high values, but falls
to vl when at least one of the buyers’ values is low.
The way this will be implemented is by having sellers coordinate such that one
of them (chosen randomly) will bid p∗ while the other will bid vl. Buyers will bid
p∗ when they have high values and vl when they have a low value. When both
bidders have high values there are three bids at p∗
h so both buyers trade and pay
p∗. When one buyer has a low value, one seller (the one who bid p∗) retains the
good, the other pair trades at the third highest bid vl. When both bidders are low,
one of them trades with the low bid seller. Notice that this is an agreement, not
an equilibrium in the bidding in the double auction. The high value bidders would
like to reduce their bids since that would lower their trading price. So buyers are
going to be part of this collusive agreement.
In the reciprocal contracting game, players simultaneously and publicly send a
message consisting of a proposal about how the game should be played, and a pair
of encrypted objects. The ﬁrst of these is an encrypted version of the player’s type,
while the second is an encrypted version of a number between 0 and 1 which we
refer to as a correlating message. Posting an encrypted type serves as a kind of
commitment device as will be seen.
If the proposals all agree, then each player provides his encryption key to every
other player so that they all learn each others’ types and correlating messages. The
game immediately moves on to the second stage where each player carries out an
action that is determined by the proposals.5
5We won’t discuss this type revelation further, but a short comment is in order. At the stage
where a player has to provide his encryption key to the other players, he has to be able to verify
that he gave the same key to every player and that this was actually the key he used to encrypt his
type information in the ﬁrst place. The ﬁrst task is easy since the encryption key is just a string
of characters which are readily veriﬁable. The second task is more complex. Roughly speaking,
some variant of the following method would work. Suppose the key consists of n − 1 characters.8 MICHAEL PETERS
If the proposals disagree, then one of two things happens: if there there are only
two distinct proposals at the ﬁrst stage, then the unencrypted types are revealed
to everyone but the single dissenting player. If there are more than two distinct
proposals, then the type reports are discarded and know one learns anything about
them.
In the second stage of the game, each player privately recommends an action to
every other player. After these messages have been sent, any player whose action
is not committed chooses his action.
The next step is to explain how all these messages resolve to an outcome. The
’proposals’ are eﬀectively a list of mechanisms that commit to actions that are
contingent on the unencrypted type reports, and correlating messages. These com-
mitments don’t depend on the actions that players recommend to one another. So
the recommended actions are cheap talk.
In the double auction example, the actions Ai for each player are bids qi in some
set. To keep a bound on notation, we assume this set is an interval, though in the
main body of the paper it is assumed that actions are taken from a ﬁnite set.
Write T as the set of pairs of types of the two buyers, and X = [0,1]
4 as a set of
four tuples of correlating messages. E (T × X) is the set of all possible encrypted
values of the types and correlating messages. We are going to take the encryption
keys to be ﬁxed in this argument and simply write e(t,x) as the encrypted versions
of (t,x). Write Di as the set of measurable mappings from T × X into the set
of bids. We refer to these mappings as enhanced direct mechanisms since they





of 4 direct mechanisms in Di for player i, with the interpretation that di is the
mechanism i will use when there is an agreement6, while pj is the mechanism that
i will use when player j unilaterally refuses to participate in the agreement. Let
δi = {δj}j=1,...,4 be a list of four mechanisms, one for each of the four players, as
proposed by player i. This is what we mean by a proposal. Let ∆ be the set of all
possible proposals. By construction, the set of possible proposals is the same for
each of the players
Each player’s ﬁrst stage message is an element of∆ × E (Ti × [0,1]). The game








di (t,x) δ1 = δ2 = δ3 = δ4
pj (t,x) δj  = δi;δi = δi
′
∀i′  = j
ai ∈ Ai otherwise.
We can now explain the mechanisms that support the collusive outcome de-
scribed above. Let x = {x1,x2,x3,x4} be the vector of correlating messages. Deﬁne
γ (x) = ⌊
 
i x1⌋, i.e., the fractional part of the sum of the correlating messages.
Then at the stage where the player publishes his type, he could give one of these characters to
each of the other players. Then, at the point where he publicly reveals the key, each of the other
players could be asked to vote on whether the public key coincides with the information they were
given initially. Some kind of majority voting rule would then support an equilibrium in which the
others would vote for valid keys and reject fabricated keys.
6There is an agreement when all the proposals are the same.A REVELATION PRINCIPLE FOR COMPETING MECHANISM GAMES : RECIPROCAL MECHANISMS 9




p∗ γ (x) > 1
2
vl γ (x) ≤ 1
2




p∗ γ (x) ≤ 1
2
vl γ (x) > 1
2.




p∗ vi = vh
vl vi = vl
For punishments, deﬁne the mechanism
ρ∗
b (v,x) = vh
when the deviating player j is a buyer, and ρ∗
s (v,x) = 0 when the deviating player
is a seller.
Our claim is that there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the reciprocal con-


















each buyer declares his type truthfully, and each player chooses a correlating mes-
sage using a uniform distribution on [0,1]. The outcome function supported by this
equilibrium is the collusive outcome described above.
To see why, notice that if each player makes this announcement at the ﬁrst stage,
then each of them is committed to use the mechanism d∗
i to determine their ﬁnal
bid. Suppose that each of the players is expected to choose his or her correlating
message uniformly from the interval [0,1], and that buyers are expected to declare
their types truthfully. If the correlating messages are all uniform, γ (x) will be
uniform. This device will ensure that half the time seller 1 sets a low price vl and
trades no matter what the buyer valuations, while seller 2 sets a high price p∗
h and
trades only if both buyers values are high.
The transformation γ has the property that if each of the players chooses his






is uniformly distributed in-
dependent on xi.7 So it is sequentially rational to choose a correlating message
using a uniform distribution.
Buyers need to carry out their part of the bargain, which commits them to bid
p∗
h when they have high types and vl when their types are low. The consequence is
that there are three bids at p∗
h when both buyers have high values and both sellers
trade at that price. If one of the buyers has a low value, then the seller who bids vl
trades with the high value bidders at price vl. Finally when both buyers have low
values, the seller who bid vl trades at that price.
7See Peters and Troncoso-Valverde (2009), who develop the idea from Kalai, Kalai, Lehrer,
and Samet (2010).10 MICHAEL PETERS
Notice that this is not part of an equilibrium in the bidding game - buyers are
committed to bid p∗ despite the fact that they realize they could lower the trading
price by bidding less. Their contracts compel them to make this bid.
Sequential rationality in this process is trivial. The consequence of deviating
and announcing some other proposal in the ﬁrst stage is to commit the others to
a punishment that makes it impossible to earn surplus in the double auction. If a
buyer deviates, the others all bid vh. If a seller deviates the others all bid 0. So
whatever bid a player makes in the double auction, he cannot make himself better
oﬀ by deviating.
The upshot is that each player (including buyers) is better oﬀ proposing (2.4)
than they are making some other proposal because any other proposal results in the
other players punishing them much in the manner of a repeated game. The appeal
of this extensive form is that it makes the competing mechanism logic trivial. This
ought to make it much easier to understand how various contracting restrictions
work.
This game describes a competing mechanism problem as a bargaining model
between mechanism designers. It isn’t an implausible descriptive story. Yet, there
are many other stories. The reason this one is interesting is two fold. First, we
have found a way to implement the most collusive outcome as a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium. We found this most collusive outcome using standard mechanism de-
sign logic - i.e., constrained maximization. What we are going to show below is
that very generally, the set of outcomes supportable as perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium in reciprocal contracting games coincides with the set of outcome functions
that are implementable in the mechanism design sense. So despite the fact that
the revelation principle applied to competitive problems doesn’t ’work’, there is
nevertheless a way to use standard revelation principle arguments to understand
outcomes supportable as equilibria in competing mechanism games.
Second, even if one has strong reason to believe that the commitment ability
players possess in the reciprocal contracting game doesn’t exist in some environ-
ments, there is a way that the game can be used to understand these environments.
Our second main theorem below shows that any outcome that is supportable as a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium in a regular competing mechanism game can also be
supported as an equilibrium in the reciprocal contracting game.
In this sense, the reciprocal contracting game plays the same role for compet-
ing mechanism environments as the revelation principle does for single principle
environments. Precisely, in a single principle environment, any incentive compati-
ble and individually rational outcome function can be implemented as a Bayesian
equilibrium using a direct mechanism. However indirect mechanisms may restrict
players ability to communicate and commit. So not every incentive compatible and
individually rational outcome can be supported with speciﬁc indirect mechanisms.
Nonetheless, an outcome function supportable by any indirect mechanism can be
supported with a direct mechanism.
The same logic applies here. Every appropriately deﬁned incentive compatible
and individually rational outcome function can be supported by perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in the reciprocal contracting game. The same thing won’t be true
for arbitrary contracting games. However, if something can be supported as an
equilibrium in some contracting game, then it can also be supported in a reciprocal
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The rest of the paper proves these things for the general case.
3. Incomplete Information Games and Mechanism Design
The basic approach in what follows is to add the contracting game on top of a
basic game of incomplete information. We refer to this basic game as the default
game. In default game, there are n players. Each player has a ﬁnite action set
Ai and a ﬁnite type set Ti. In standard notation A, A−i represent cross product
spaces representing all players actions and the actions of all the players other than
i, respectively. Similarly, deﬁne T =
 
i Ti, and T−i =
 
j =i Tj. Types are jointly
distributed on T according to some common prior.
Let q be a mixture over the set of action proﬁles A. The notation Q is used to
represent the set of all such mixtures. For any action proﬁle a, we write qa to be the
probability of a under q, and qai =
 
a−i qai,a−i. We use notation qAi to represent
the marginal distribution over Ai and qA−i to be the marginal distribution over
A−i. We assume that players have expected utility preferences over lotteries. Then
players preferences are given by ui : Q×T → R where ui is linear in q. An outcome
function is a mapping ω : T → Q. So player i’s payoﬀ from this outcome function
is E{ui (ω (t),t)|ti}.
One way to resolve this game is to have a mechanism designer collect information
from the players, then tell each player what action to take. We think of the mech-
anism designer as an enforcer here, not just a coordinator - players who agree to
participate in the mechanism have to carry out the action the mechanism designer
tells them to whether they want to or not.
An outcome function ω is implementable (by a mechanism designer) if the usual
incentive compatibility and individual rationality conditions hold. Formally, an
outcome function ω is incentive compatible if for every i, ti and t′
i,
(3.1) E{ui (ω (t),t)|ti} ≥ E{ui (ω (t′
i,t−i),t)|ti}.
This is completely standard so there is no need to discuss it further. What is
diﬀerent in our approach is what happens when a player refuses to participate in
the mechanism designer’s scheme. A player who refuses to participate has to go
back and pick an action in the default game. So the outside option is both type
dependent and endogenous.
We allow the mechanism designer to implement a punishment that solicits in-
formation from the non-participating player, and allows the mechanism designer
to make a recommendation to the non-participating player about which action he
should take. This recommendation may depend on the types of the participating
players and should obey the usual obedience constraint which requires that the
non-participating player should want to carry out any recommendation given his
beliefs conditional on receiving that recommendation.
Let ρi : T → Q be an outcome function that is implemented when player i
chooses not to participate in the mechanism that implements ω. We refer to this
outcome function as a punishment. The outcome function ω is individually rational
if there is a collection of punishments {ρi}i=1,n such that for every player i,
E{uj (ω (t),t)|ti} ≥
















|ti,˜ ai,t′  
E{ρ˜ ai (t′
i,t−i)|ti}.
What we are going to show is that the set of outcome functions that can be
implemented can also be supported as equilibria in competing mechanism games.
It is almost immediate that equilibria in competing mechanism games are imple-
mentable.
Most of the work in the rest of the paper is devoted to explaining exactly how
implementable outcome functions can be supported as decentralized equilibria in
competing mechanism games. It is important to understand the diﬀerence between
competing mechanisms and implementation. A mechanism designer controls the
actions of all the players once they agree to participate in his mechanism. In a
competing mechanism game, players can only commit themselves. Furthermore,
all communication must occur between players in a competing mechanism game.
There are no coordinators or disinterested agents who can coordinate play.8
3.1. What is a Competing Mechanism Game. There are probably countably
many ways to model competing mechanism games. Examples come from the com-
peting auction literature (for example, Epstein and Peters (1999),Yamashita (2010)
or Peters and Troncoso-Valverde (2009)) or the literature on common agency (Pa-
van and Calzolari (2001) or Martimort and Stole (2002) or Bernheim and Whinston
(1986)) in which mechanism designers simultaneously oﬀer mechanisms which make
commitments based on a speciﬁc group of players called agents. However a useful
description should also capture models in which mechanisms are oﬀered sequen-
tially, as in Pavan and Calzolari (2009) or privately as in Segal and Whinston
(2003) or Duquietd and Martimort (2012).
Rather than trying to develop this tedious formalism, we take a slightly diﬀerent
approach here. We interpret a competing mechanism game as an extensive form
game of incomplete information. We interpret the nodes of this game as opportuni-
ties for players to send messages. A path through the game is an ordered sequence
of messages. Some of these messages convey commitments, some type information,
while some are just cheap talk. In order to interpret the messages, we use an out-
come function λ which assigns a proﬁle of actions to each path through the game
tree. The proﬁle of actions indirectly determines each player’s payoﬀ.
The picture that follows shows the reciprocal contracting version of a simple
prisoner’s dilemma game (with the cheap talk part left out to make it simpler).
8Of course, the rules of the game serve to coordinate play. In this sense there is coordination
























































In this game, players announce public messages representing commitments over
two rounds. In the ﬁrst round, each player can oﬀer a contract that conditions
directly on the other player’s contract. This is the contract θ∗ in the picture. The
alternative is a contract θcd that allows the player to defer his choice until the
second round. The outcome function λ is displayed on the far right of the picture.
Notice that if player 1 announces the message θ∗ in his ﬁrst information set, then
the outcome function forces him to use action c in every history in which player 2
uses message θ∗, and to use action d in every other history following that choice.
So from the outcome function λ, the interpretation of the message θ∗ is that it is a
reciprocal contract that commits player 1 to use action c if player to sends signal
θ∗, and to use d otherwise.
Any set of behavioral strategies specify a possibly random path consisting of a
sequence of messages. The outcome function λ converts every sequence of messages
into a proﬁle of actions for the players. Player i’s payoﬀ in the history in which
players send the sequence of messages m is given by ui (λ(m),t). In the exten-
sive form version of the reciprocal contracting game pictured above, the history of
messages {θ∗,θ∗,d,d} supports the proﬁle of actions {c,c}.
Let {σi,bi}i=1,...n be behavioral strategies and beliefs for the players specifying
mixtures over messages available to players in each of their information sets, and
beliefs about the history of play prior to the information set. Let ι be an information
set for player i. The continuation game associated with ι is the extensive form
game of incomplete information in which each player’s type is his payoﬀ type from
the original game along with his information about the history of play prior to ι.
Beliefs for player i in this continuation game are given by bi (ι). For every other
player j, the player’s type tj in the continuation game describes (among other
things) the most recent information set ιj in which he sent a message. So player
j’s belief in the continuation game coincide with his beliefs in the information set14 MICHAEL PETERS
ιj. Associated with each history h ∈ ι, there is an outcome function that describes
type contingent mixtures over action proﬁles when all players use the continuation
strategies associated with {σi,σ−i} from the information set ι onward. Using i’s
beliefs in the information set ι, we write ρ(ti,t−i|σi,σ−i,ι) as the outcome function
conditional on attaining this information set when players are using the continuation
strategies associated with (σi,σ−i).
Given an array of behavioral strategies {σi,σ−i}, a collection of information sets
I is attainable with probability π by player i in the continuation game associated
with ι if there is a continuation strategy for i at ι such that an information set in
I is reached with probability at least π given i’s beliefs bi (ι) and the continuation
strategies σ−i.
An information set ι for player i has the no-commitment property if (i) the
outcome function ρA−i (ti,t−i|σ′
i,σ−i,ι) is independent of σ′
i, and (ii) for each ai ∈
Ai, there is a strategy σ′
i such that ρAi (ti,t−i|σ′
i,σ−i) assigns probability 1 to the
action ai. In words, a no-commitment information set is one in which i can carry
out any action he likes without changing the behavior of the other players. We
say that a player i is uncommitted in information set ι if he has a continuation
strategy that attains an information set having the no-commitment property with
probability 1.
Deﬁnition 1. A contracting game is said to be regular if for every proﬁle σ of
strategies, each player i has a strategyσ′
i that attains some no-commitment infor-
mation set with probability 1.9
This restriction is imposed because we are interested in adding contracts that
enhance players’ strategy sets, not in contracting games that impose arbitrary re-
strictions on what players can do. For example, consider the complete information
game of matching pennies (with payoﬀs 1 and −1). This game has a unique Nash
equilibrium in which both players’ payoﬀ is zero, which makes it pretty predictive
by game theoretic standards. We already know we could change the outcome of
this game by removing actions, or changing timing. We want to know whether
contracts that both players would want to use might change the set of equilibrium
outcomes for the game.
Suppose we specify the following contracting game: player 2 is allowed to choose
one of two contracts. The ﬁrst commits him to tails, the second to heads. We now
allow player 1, still moving simultaneously with player 2, to commit himself in a
manner that depends on the commitment made by player 2.10 The only equilibrium
would then have player 1 committing to match (or mismatch) the commitment of
player 2. Payoﬀs would then be 1 for player 1 and 0 for player 2.
In this example, we would say equilibrium strategies are not regular for player 2.
If player 1 is using his equilibrium strategy, then there are no strategies available to
player 2 that allow him to change actions without simultaneously changing player
1’s response. The contracting game we build on top of the matching pennies is
simply depriving player 2 of the ability to select his action simultaneously with
player 1.
It is possible to use the methods we describe below to analyze irregular games.
For example, in the matching pennies example, if the asymmetric contract structure
9This deﬁnition is inspired by a similar assumption in Peters and Szentes (2012).
10This is how the meet the competition argument works.A REVELATION PRINCIPLE FOR COMPETING MECHANISM GAMES : RECIPROCAL MECHANISMS 15
seems the right one for some reason, then we could analyze it by changing the orig-
inal game from matching pennies to sequential matching pennies. The contracting
game would then be regular with respect to this sequential game.
The ﬁrst part of our theorem is then given in the following:
Theorem 2. Suppose the outcome function ω can be supported as a weak Perfect
Bayesian equilibrium in some regular contracting game. Then there is a collection
of punishments {ρi}i=1,...,n such that (3.1), and (3.2) hold.
The formal proof is in the appendix, but the logic is straightforward. If the
competing mechanism game is regular, then any player can deviate to the strategy
that leads to a no-commitment information set. This deviation induces some con-
tinuation play that determines the punishment ρi. Since this is a deviation from an
equilibrium in the game, it must be unproﬁtable for the deviator no matter what
he does in the continuation. This guarantees that (3.2) holds.
3.2. Reciprocal Contracting. We turn now to the reverse problem. If there is
a collection of punishments ρi that make an outcome function ω implementable,
we want to show that there is a competing mechanism game that supports ω as a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Consistent with our overall approach, a competing
mechanism game is a mapping that converts every sequence of messages into a set
of commitments.
We described the reciprocal contracting game in the introduction. In the ﬁrst
stage of the game, players make public proposals about how the game should be
played, and publicly post encrypted versions of their type and an encrypted num-
ber in the interval [0,1]. If the proposals all agree, the unencrypted types and
correlating messages are revealed to all the players. If there are only two distinct
proposals, the types and correlating messages are revealed to all but the dissenting
player. If there are more than two distinct proposals, the encrypted information
is discarded. The second stage of the game is a cheap talk game in which each
player recommends an action to each other players before each uncommitted player
chooses his action.
Public messages for each player are contained in the set ∆ × E {Ti × [0,1]} in
the ﬁrst stage. Recall that a proposal in ∆ is a list of mechanisms. To understand
the elements of this list, let ˆ T ≡
 
j [Tj × [0,1]] be the set containing the decrypted
type declarations and correlating messages of all the players. Let Di be the set
of measurable mappings di : ˆ T → Ai. We refer to each of these mappings as

















describes what player i proposes that player j do. In this
description, each di and pi










, then i is proposing that player j use the direct mechanism dj to
convert the type and correlating messages into an action in Aj. If it turns out that
player k unilaterally refuses to go along with this agreement, then i’s proposal says
that player j should use pk
j to convert the decrypted type and correlating messages
from the ﬁrst round into actions. In this sense pk
j is the punishment that player i
suggests that player j should use to punish player k. Then a proposal δi ∈ ∆ by
player i is a description of what player i thinks that each of the players should do.16 MICHAEL PETERS
The message space for player i in the cheap talk game is A−i. The cheap talk
messages are recommendations. Uncommitted players then choose actions that
depend on these cheap talk messages.










di (t,x) ∃δ∗ : δj = δ∗∀j
p
j
i (t,x) ∃δ∗ : ∃!j : δj  = δ∗ ∧ j  = i
ai ∈ Ai otherwise.
In this notation, pi
j and di represent the corresponding elements of δi and the
notation ∃! means “there exists a unique”.
One aspect of this that may deserve comment is the fact that when some player j
is a unilateral dissenter, the others punish him by using mechanisms that make use
of his type and correlating message. Of course, the others can ignore his type and
correlating message if they want. If they choose to make use of that information,
then the way they use it should be designed so that the dissenter is happy to report
his information truthfully.
This formalism now makes it possible to state the ﬁrst theorem.
Theorem 3. If there are four or more players and ω is an outcome function satis-
fying (3.1), and (3.2), then there is a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the reciprocal
contracting game that supports ω. Furthermore, along the equilibrium path of this
game, all players make a common proposal δ∗, declare their type truthfully in the
ﬁrst stage, and choose a correlating message uniformly from the interval [0,1].
The full proof is contained in Section 7.2. There are two basic complications
involved in proving the theorem. The ﬁrst, stems from the fact that the outcome
function ω (t) involves a joint randomization, possibly involving correlation, over
the actions of all the players, while any commitment δ by player i only commits him
to a randomization over his own actions. This is where the correlating messages
are used. We adopt a method from Kalai, Kalai, Lehrer, and Samet (2010) (and a
slight generalization of it in Peters and Troncoso-Valverde (2009)) which converts
the private correlating messages into something that works like a public randomizing
device that the players cannot manipulate. Once we have created this device (details
are in the proof), it is straightforward to construct the contracts that implement ω
and its various punishments ρj.
The second complication stems from the fact that when the mechanism designer
punishes a player who refuses to participate, he might need to send the player an
informative recommendation. Since there is no centralized mechanism designer in
the reciprocal contracting game, we need to ﬁnd a way to induce the punishing
players to send the right recommendations on their own. These recommendations
have to depend on the types of all the players. At the same time, there cannot
be any incentive for the players who are communicating these recommendations to
manipulate them. We accomplish this by having the deviating player ignore recom-
mendations from the others unless they agree. This is where the assumption that
there are four or more players is used. The deviator will hear at least three recom-
mendations, and will follow them provided at least two of them agree. At the point
where the punishing players send their recommendations, they (think that) they
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their recommendation is that they anticipate a very speciﬁc type contingent rec-
ommendation from the other punishing players and believe their recommendation
will be ignored if it doesn’t match. Then continuation play supports an outcome in
which the punishing players send the same recommendations because each of them
expects the others to send that recommendation.
4. The Equivalence of Competing Mechanisms and Reciprocal
Contracting
Combining this theorem with Theorem 3 gives the following corollary:
Theorem 4. An outcome function ω is supportable as an equilibrium in a regular
competing mechanism game with four or more players, if and only if it is supportable
as an equilibrium in the reciprocal contracting game.
The basic logic of reciprocal mechanisms is quite simple - competing mechanisms
are complex, but ultimately, it is possible to understand quite a bit about them
by using well understood logic that looks much like the logic in repeated games.
As with the literature on repeated games, this means that many things can be
supported as equilibrium outcomes. It is important to understand that there are
two distinct reasons for multiplicity here. As always, any particular competing
mechanism game can have many equilibrium outcomes. For example, the reciprocal
contracting game we described above has a large number of equilibrium outcomes.
However, there are also many diﬀerent ways to model competing mechanisms.
Each model can have many equilibrium outcomes. The reciprocal contracting game
described above can be used to understand all these outcomes. This is analogous
to the fact that there are many diﬀerent incentive compatible outcomes that can
be described using the revelation principle. In practice, some kind of external
selection criteria has to be applied to choose among these outcomes. For example,
in a problem with collusion one could maximize the payoﬀ of the colluding players
across all outcomes that satisfy (3.1), and (3.2) in order to identify behavioral
properties that could be used to identify collusion. Furthermore, the reciprocal
contracting game provides a convenient contracting game (analogous to a direct
mechanism in the usual revelation story) that can be used to think about strategic
issues.
One example of a regular contracting game is any cheap talk extension of the
basic Bayesian game described in Section 3 that does not allow players any addi-
tional commitment ability. In any such game, players are uncommitted in every
information set. The set of outcome functions supportable as equilibrium in such a
game is just the set of communications equilibrium (Forges (1986)) of the original
game, and can be described formally by setting ρi = ω for each player in (3.2).
Any communications equilibrium outcome is supported as an equilibrium in the
reciprocal contracting game in the obvious way (since ρi = ω for each i).
Constraints on Contracting
As we have mentioned, most competing mechanism models make very speciﬁc
assumptions about what can and can’t be contracted on. As we have shown, the
outcome functions supportable as weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium in such a game
must be contained in the set of outcome functions supportable as perfect Bayesian18 MICHAEL PETERS
equilibrium in a reciprocal contracting game. This suggests that constraints on
contracting can be translated into constraints on the set of supportable outcomes.
The reciprocal contracting game provides a convenient way to introduce these
restrictions. To illustrate, it is useful to return to the example at the beginning of
the paper. To recall the particulars, two buyers and two sellers are participating in
a double auction. The most collusive outcome for sellers involved the sellers sharing
the responsibility of bidding a very high price p∗ > vh. Buyers bid the price p∗
when their values are high (i.e. vh), and the price vl when their values are low.
No player has an incentive to deviate to any other agreement because he or she
expects the others to respond to the deviation with a new agreement that hurts the
deviator (as well as the other players).
This agreement could not be supported as a Bayesian equilibrium because each
buyer has an incentive to lower their bid when they have a high value. So one natural
constraint on contracting is simply to assume that the two buyers cannot make
any commitments at all. The reciprocal contracting game is a regular contracting
game, so the sellers cannot modify their own behavior in a way that responds to the
behavior of the buyers in the double auction. As a consequence, this restriction on
contracting can be completely captured by adding a couple of constraints to (3.1)
and (3.2), since the buyers behavior in the double auction must simply be a best
reply to whatever agreement the sellers implement.11
Evidently the agreement we described above, which implements prices p∗ and vl
is not longer supportable, since both buyers would strictly increase their surplus by
lowering the bids when they have high value in order to avoid the costly trade. In
fact, it is easy enough to see in this problem that if the buyers can’t commit, then
they cannot be induced to bid more than vh when their values are high, or vl when
their values are low. So the constraints to be added to (2.1) and (2.2) are simply
that phh ≤ vh and phl ≤ vl. This leaves exactly one point in the shaded triangle in
Figure 2.1 - i.e. the point (vh,vl) lying on the low ﬂat line representing the set of
outcomes that are incentive compatible for the low value buyer.
This outcome is supported by the sellers with contracts that threaten to bid 0 in
the event of a deviation, then having buyers bid 0 in the continuation, anticipating
that the deviating seller will do the same.
The appealing thing about this story is how nicely it illustrates the impact of
imposing the contracting constraint on buyers. Many restrictions on contracting
will work exactly this way. For example, one might expect that if there are many
buyers and sellers, and a large group of these buyers and seller are unable to commit,
then their non-cooperative behavior in the double auction would discipline any
collusive outcome among the players. Any kind of complete analysis of this issue
would go well beyond the scope of this paper.
Note also that some of the features of reciprocal contracting appear precisely to
deal with contracting constraints. For example, colluding players may well want
to communicate some of their information to the players who can’t commit. The
cheap talk phase of the game is what allows them to do this using the same meth-
ods that they use to support correlation in their outcomes. This cheap talk game
plays no role in the argument that is used to show how to support outcome func-
tions in Bayesian equilibrium since players behavior following a deviation needn’t
11Observe here that the buyers behavior in the double auction could change depending on
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be sequentially rational. However, see Celik and Peters (2011a) to see why this
information will play a role in describing subgame perfect equilibrium.
Finally, one remark about external mediation. There is a sense in which every
game involves an external mediator who deﬁnes the rules for players and ensures
that these rules are carried out. The external mediator tells the players what mes-
sages they can send and what the consequences of these message will be. Obviously
the reciprocal contracing game is just like this. However, centralized mechanism
design as it is customarily used involved the mediator in a more direct way - this
mediator receives messages from agents, computes the action each player should
take, then gives each agent an instruction about what to do. So there is two way
communication between players and the mediator.
The reciprocal contracting game avoids this second kind of communication. The
rules of the game are common knowledge, but all remaining communication is be-
tween the players themselves. The reason for doing this is that many competing
mechanism games have this property (outcomes are determined by players com-
municating among themselves). It is natural to wonder whether this is actually a
restriction on what players can accomplish. The results of this paper show that it
is not. The reciprocal contracting game imposes no implicit restrictions on players
ability to contract among themselves, however its formulation is designed to analyze
situations in which such restrictions exist.
5. Literature
Epstein and Peters (1999) provides a type space and set of mechanisms which
allows agents to convey market information along with information about their
payoﬀ type. They show that every mechanism that is oﬀered in the equilibrium
of a principal-agent type competing mechanism game coincides with a mechanism
in universal set of mechanisms in which agents report types that convey all their
market information. The set of mechanisms that is feasible in a particular game
maps into a small subset of the universal set of mechanism. Nonetheless, they were
able to show that provided mechanism were not restricted in how they dealt with
payoﬀ types, pure strategy equilibria are typically robust to expansion of the set of
feasible mechanisms. Thus pure strategy equilibrium in ’naive’ direct mechanisms
(for example, the equilibrium in competing direct mechanisms described by McAfee
(1993)) can be supported as equilibrium relative to the universal set of mechanisms.
The diﬃculty with naive direct mechanisms is that they cannot be used to charac-
terize some of the outcomes that can be supported as equilibrium relative to the
universal set of mechanisms.
The literature on common agency (many competing principals, but only a single
agent) tries to remedy this by abandoning the revelation principle, and simply ask-
ing for some set of indirect mechanisms that could be used to support all outcomes
that might quality as common agency equilibrium. Martimort and Stole (2002)
and Peters (2001a) show that every (robust) equilibrium relative to any set of indi-
rect mechanisms in common agency is an equilibrium relative to the set of menus.
Pavan and Calzolari (2009) show a similar result for common agency using what
they call the set of ’extended direct mechanisms’. All robust pure equilibrium in
common agency are equilibrium relative to the set of extended direct mechanisms.
As useful as the common agency tools are, they have two shortcomings. First,
common agency is special since there can only be one agent, and principals can’t20 MICHAEL PETERS
communicate. Second, though the set of mechanisms (menus) that this literature
oﬀers is considerably simpler than the universal set of mechanisms, they are not
suﬃciently structured to allow a characterization of supportable outcomes.12
Yamashita (2010) has recently suggested a way to extend the common agency
logic to problems in which each principal has many agents. One way to think
about his approach is simply to imagine that the principal oﬀers his agents a menu
of options and commits himself to carry out that option if a majority of ask for it. A
useful characterization of equilibrium outcomes with Yamashita’s contracts doesn’t
exist13 though Peters and Troncoso-Valverde (2009) show that this set is at least
as large as the set of outcome functions supportable by a centralized mechanism
designer.
It has been long known that contracting games support lots of equilibrium out-
comes in games of complete information. Starting with the large literature on
delegation games (Fershtman and Judd (1987), or Fershtman and Kalai (1997)), a
more recent literature illustrates how contracts change the basic nature of games
by allowing players to respond to deviations by other players. In particular, Ten-
nenholtz (2004) describes a game in which players’ simultaneously choose computer
programs which implement their actions. These programs can take as inputs the
programs chosen by the other players. He shows that any proﬁle of actions in which
each player receives at least his min max payoﬀ can be supported as an equilibrium
in this game. His paper doesn’t show that all program equilibria involve proﬁles of
actions in which all players attain at least their minmax payoﬀ. Peters and Szentes
(2012) study a model of an n-player incomplete information game in which players’
contracts are deﬁnable functions of other players’ contracts instead of programs.
They provide a full characterization of pure strategy equilibria of this game and
show that the set of outcome functions supportable as pure strategy Bayesian equi-
libria in this game coincides with the set of non-randomized outcome functions that
can be implemented by a centralized mechanism designer. Their paper provides an
explanation of why regularity of a contracting game is needed in order to provide a
characterization. The main result in their paper is the demonstration that a game
in deﬁnable contracts is regular.14
Kalai, Kalai, Lehrer, and Samet (2010) are the ﬁrst to ask whether it is possible
to ﬁnd a contracting game which supports all mixtures of actions in which all
players receive at least their minmax payoﬀ. They provide such a contracting game
for any two player game of complete information. Of course, the contracting game
in Peters and Szentes (2012) provides such a contracting game to n-player games of
incomplete information whose supportable (in pure strategies) outcome functions
coincide with the set of non-random outcome functions supportable by a centralized
mechanism designer. One of the contributions of this paper is to extend Peters and
Szentes (2012) to support randomization and correlation. To avoid the complexities
of deﬁnability, this is accomplished here by restricting players to a very small set of
contracts which nonetheless preserve the conditions for implementability provided
in that paper. The methods for supporting mixed and correlated actions for players
12Characterizations of outcomes for special environments have been given by Peters and
Troncoso-Valverde (2009). Though it might not be apparent why yet, we would also include
Tennenholtz (2004) and Kalai, Kalai, Lehrer, and Samet (2010) in this category.
13Yamashita’s game isn’t regular in the sense deﬁned above.
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as Bayesian equilibria in decentralized contracting games of incomplete information
were provided initially by Peters and Troncoso-Valverde (2009). In completely
independent work, Forges (2012) accomplishes a very similar extension by directly
extending the approach in Kalai, Kalai, Lehrer, and Samet (2010).
The application of all these models to competing mechanism games is somewhat
limited by the fact that they are simple one shot simultaneous move games, and
that the solution concept is Bayesian equilibrium. Competing mechanism games
tend to be more complex, since they can involve sequential contracting or private
negotiations. As far as I know, all models of competing mechanism and common
agency impose some kind of sequential rationality reﬁnement. Peters and Szentes
(2012) illustrate that in one shot simultaneous move contracting games, the ability
to support all the outcomes supported by a mechanism designer breaks down as
soon as any kind of sequential rationality restriction is imposed on continuation
play after a deviation.
The reciprocal contracting game provided here supports centralized outcomes
as perfect Bayesian equilibria. In this sense, it addresses the problem identiﬁed
by Peters and Szentes (2012). The result illustrates that sequential rationality by
itself doesn’t impose any restriction on players’ behavior when they have enough
contracting ability. Indeed, the point of the reciprocal contracting game is not so
much to show how to deal with sequential rationality as it is to provide a framework
in which successive restrictions on players’ commitment ability can be imposed in
order to isolate their eﬀect. Indeed, sequential rationality is achieved here by giving
players the opportunity to commit themselves privately to messages before they
learn whether or not there has been a deviation.
However the point is not to support reﬁnements, but to provide a framework
in which to understand how restrictions on contracting are changing the nature of
equilibrium.
6. Conclusion
We have shown that all equilibria of competing mechanism games can be un-
derstood using reciprocal mechanisms. The advantage of this is that reciprocal
mechanisms are conceptually no more diﬃcult to work with than ordinary direct
mechanisms. So reciprocal mechanisms provide a useful analytic approach for prob-
lems in which a broad class of mechanisms is feasible.
Like direct mechanisms, reciprocal mechanisms make it possible to understand
equilibrium outcomes with competition without worrying about the intricacies of
particular indirect mechanisms that are used in practice. Apart from the standard
logic of incentive constraints, reciprocal mechanisms simply add the logic that if
everyone else wants to do something, it is simple to write a contract that commits
you to do it too.
7. Appendix: Proofs
7.1. Proof of Theorem 2.
Theorem 5. (Restatement of Theorem) Suppose the outcome function ω can be
supported as a weak Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in some regular contracting game.
Then there is a collection of punishments {ρi}i=1,...,n such that (3.1), and (3.2)
hold.22 MICHAEL PETERS
Proof. Let ω (t) be the outcome function supported by some equilibrium of a regular
competing mechanism game in which strategies are σ∗. It satisﬁes (3.1) by the usual
revelation principle.
The game is regular, so i has a behavioral strategy σ′
i that attains a no-commitment
information set with probability 1. Write
(7.1) ˆ ρ(t|σ′
i) ≡ Eι {ρ(t|σ∗,ι)|t,σ′
i}.
In words, ˆ ρ is the outcome function that prevails when player i uses the behavioral
strategy σ′
i then reverts to σ∗
i once a no-commitment information set is attained.




A player with type ti can mimic the behavior of a player of type t′
i by adopting
the same mixture over feasible messages in each of his information sets as the
type t′
i player does in each of his corresponding information sets. Modifying the
behavioral strategy in this way provides a new behavioral strategy that attains a
no-commitment information set with probability 1. The payoﬀ to player a player




Furthermore, once this new behavioral strategy reaches a no-commitment infor-
mation set, we can modify the strategy again by having the player with type ti
adopt his original strategy σ∗ from that information set on. So if i has a behavioral
strategy that attains a no-commitment information set with probability 1, then




































The equality follows from the law of iterated expectations and the fact that the
joint distribution of actions of the other players is independent of ai in every no-
commitment information set. The inequality follows from the fact that σ′
i attains
a no-commitment information set with probability 1. This veriﬁes that the punish-
ment ˆ ρ(·|σ′
i) satisﬁes (3.2). ¤
7.2. Proof of Theorem 3.
Theorem. If the reciprocal contracting game has four or more players, there is
a weak Perfect Bayesian equilibrium that supports the outcome function ω if ω
satisﬁes (3.1), (3.2). Furthermore, along the equilibrium path of this game, all
players announce a common proposal δ∗ , declare their types truthfully, and choose
a correlating message uniformly from the interval [0,1] in the ﬁrst stage.
Proof. We start by showing that an outcome function that satisﬁes (3.1) and (3.2)
can be supported as a weak Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The reciprocal contracts
that are announced along the equilibrium path of the game require a direct mecha-
nism for each player and a list of punishment mechanisms. We begin by describing
these mechanisms. Then we describe the equilibrium path proposals.A REVELATION PRINCIPLE FOR COMPETING MECHANISM GAMES : RECIPROCAL MECHANISMS 23
Index the action proﬁles in A in some arbitrary way. Let ωk (t) be the probability
assigned to action proﬁle ak by the outcome function ω when player types are given
by the vector t. The notation ak
i means the action taken by player i in action proﬁle
ak. For (t,x) ∈ ˆ Ti, let ti and xi be the type and correlating message declared by




















The notation ⌊y⌋ means the fractional part of the real number y. This function
aggregates the correlating messages into a number between 0 and 1, then uses this
to choose an action proﬁle in A. The mechanism then commits i to carry out his
part ak
i of the corresponding action proﬁle ak.
This will implement outcome ak with probability ωk (ti,t−i) provided each of
the xj are uniformly distributed on [0,1]. The property of this construction that
will be especially useful below, is the fact that as long as each of the other play-
ers is choosing xj uniformly, the random variable ⌊xi +
 
j =i xj⌋ is uniform on
[0,1] for each value of xi.15 What this means is that the probability distribution
over i’s actions is independent of xi. As a consequence, it is sequentially rational
for i to choose his correlating message uniformly from [0,1] (no matter what his
commitment) provided he thinks the other players are doing the same.
By (3.2), there is a collection of punishments {ρi}i=1,...,n associated with ω.























As above, this will implement j’s part of the punishment providing reports are
truthful and correlating messages are uniform.
We are now ready to give the strategies associated with the Perfect Bayesian














By (3.3), if all players announce this same proposal, then each player i is committed
to use the direct mechanism dω
i (t,x).
If all players make proposal δ∗, declare their types truthfully, and choose a cor-
relating message using a uniform distribution, then every player should anticipate
the outcome function ω. Since ω is incentive compatible, it cannot pay for any
player to deviate by announcing a false type. We explained above, a player cannot
improve his payoﬀ by choosing correlation messages from some other distribution
than the uniform. Since all players actions are committed in this case, the cheap
talk game in the second stage is irrelevant. So if there is a proﬁtable deviation, it
must include announcing a proposal other than δ∗.
15This device is from the paper Kalai, Kalai, Lehrer, and Samet (2010) who do this for two
players. A proof of this last property when there are more than two players is given in Peters and
Troncoso-Valverde (2009).24 MICHAEL PETERS
By (3.3), a player who makes an alternative proposal learns nothing about the
type declarations or correlating messages of the others, and simply chooses his
action in the second stage. However, his type declaration and correlating message
are still observed by the others. Furthermore, he should expect to receive private
messages from each of the other players before he takes his action.
If it is player j who makes an alternative proposal, then each of the other players
should send a message to j consisting of a recommended action ˜ aj that j is supposed
to take in the default game. This action is based on j’s type declaration in the ﬁrst





















This is just j’s part of the punishment outcome.
Player j’s strategy is to play the recommended action if he declared his type
truthfully at the ﬁrst stage, and if all or all but one of the recommendations coincide.
If his initial declaration was false, then he should choose any best reply conditional
on his beliefs after seeing the recommendation. If there are three or more distinct





based on his interim beliefs where ˜ ti is his ﬁrst stage declaration.
It is sequentially rational for the players other than j to make the equilibrium
recommendation in this case because the don’t believe they can change any out-
come by deviating, given that the others make this recommendation. Sequential
rationality is built into the continuation strategy for for j in every information set
except those in which j declared his type truthfully and received no more than two
distinct recommendations. Sequential rationality follows in this case from (3.2).
Finally, a player who unilaterally deviates and makes an alternative proposal
should nonetheless declare his type truthfully in the ﬁrst stage by the ﬁrst part of
(3.2). ¤
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